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THE RIGHT TO REMAIN ARMED
JEFFREY BELLIN*
ABSTRACT

The laws governing gun possession are changing rapidly. In the past
two years, federal courts have wielded a revitalized Second Amendment to
invalidate longstanding gun carrying restrictions in Chicago, the District
of Columbia, and throughout California. Invoking similar Second
Amendment themes, legislators across the country have steadily
deregulated public gun carrying, preempting municipal gun control
ordinances in cities like Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Cleveland.
These changes to substantive gun laws reverberate through the
constitutional criminal procedure framework. By making it lawful for
citizens to carry guns even in crowded urban areas, enhanced Second
Amendment rights trigger Fourth Amendment protections that could
radically transform American policing. Evidence of handgun possessionwhether from a tip or observation-is increasingly an inadequate
justification for a Fourth Amendment stop; officers will struggle to
articulate legal grounds for temporarily disarming citizens during face-toface encounters; and the promise of gun-detecting technology as an
alternative to invasive investigative techniques, such as pretextual arrests
and frisks, may be squelched. Whether observers view these implications
as beneficial, disastrous, or something in between, one thing is clear:
courts, policymakers, and academics must begin to address the dramatic
Fourth Amendment implications of an expanding Second Amendment
"right to remain armed. "

* Professor, William & Mary Law School. I would like to thank Adam Gershowitz, Kay
Levine, Joyce Malcolm, and Scott Sundby for comments on a draft of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

In December 2012, a deranged gunman killed twenty children and six
adults at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut.'
The school shooting sparked a national debate about firearms and,
momentarily, raised the specter of a renewed push for gun control
legislation. 2 In the end, however, the tragedy served only to highlight the

I. Steve Vogel et al., Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement
Sources Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politicslsandy-hookelementary-school-shooting-leaves-students-staff-dead/20 12/12/14/24334570-461 e-ll e2-8e70-e 19935
28222d_ story.html.
2. Philip Rucker & Peter Wallsten, Biden 's Gun Task Force Met with All Sides, but Kept Its Eye
on the Target, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bidens-gun-taskforce-met-with-all-sides-but-kept-its-eye-on-the-target/20 13/0 I /19/520d77a6-60c5-11 e2-b05a-605528
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power of countervailing forces in American society. Guns were indeed on
the legislative agenda following Sandy Hook, but legislators generally
sought to expand, not restrict, gun rights. In the year following the Sandy
Hook shooting, almost every state enacted at least one new gun law, but
"[n]early two-thirds of the new laws ease restrictions and expand the rights
of gun owners."3 Punctuating this trend, in 2014, Georgia enacted the
"Safe Carry Protection Act," labeled by critics the "Guns Everywhere"
law. 4 The law abolishes most limits on where people can carry firearms,
loosens restrictions on who can carry a gun, and curbs the ability of police
to investigate whether a person carrying a gun possesses a license. 5
In the dwindling number of jurisdictions where legislators continue to
support strict gun regulation, judges, rather than politicians, spearhead the
gun-rights movement. The United States Supreme Court opened the
judicial front in 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller, 6 ruling that "the
District's ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second
Amendment." 7 Heller's broader implications came into focus in 2014,
when the Ninth Circuit applied the case to mandate that California cities
permit law-abiding citizens to carry handguns in public. 8

f6b712_story.html (describing efforts of task force appointed by President Obama in wake of Sandy
Hook shooting).
3. Karen Yourish et al., State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year Since Newtown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
I 0, 2013 ), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/1 0/us/state-gun-laws-enacted-in-the-year-sincenewtown.html?_r=O (surveying state legislation after Sandy Hook); see also Michael Cooper, Debate
on Gun Control Is Revived, amid a Trend Toward Fewer Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/12/16/us/politics/connecticut-shooting-revives-gun-control-debate. htrnl?
r=O (contrasting anti-gun reaction to Sandy Hook with nationwide trend of expanding gun rights).
4. Larry Copeland & Doug Richards, Ga. Governor Signs 'Guns Everywhere' into Law, USA
TODAY (Apr. 23, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/23/georgiagun-law/8046315/.
5. Safe Carry Protection Act, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1-5 (Ga. 2014),
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/display/201320 14/HB/60 (amending Ga. Code
to permit concealed firearms in bars, places of worship, and most government buildings); id. §§ 1-6,
1-9 (expanding authority to permit concealed firearms in schools); id. § 1-7 (providing that persons
under twenty-one but at least eighteen years of age with military service can obtain a concealed carry
license and removing disqualification for persons convicted of "[p]ointing a gun or a pistol at
another"); id. § 1-10 (prohibiting detention for the sole purpose of determining whether a person with a
weapon has a license).
6. 554 u.s. 570 (2008).
7. !d. at 635.
8. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir. 20 14) (invalidating California's
restrictive licensing framework as applied in San Diego), vacated and reh 'g granted en bane, 781 F.3d
1106 (9th Cir. 2015); Ed Joyce, With Restrictions Relaxed, Thousands Apply to Carry Concealed
Firearms in OC, KPCC (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/news/2014/04/14/43439/good-causegone-orange-county-sheriff-issuing-conc/ (reporting that, after Peruta, "3,500 [people] have applied"
in the county for a concealed weapons permit, even though the county "typically get[s] about 500
applications a year" and averages, "at any given time, about 940" licensed concealed weapons
holders).
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The sweeping changes to America's substantive gun laws reverberate
throughout American policing. Particularly in America's cities, efforts to
combat violent crime center on gun-policing strategies, colloquially
known as "getting guns off the streets."9 Echoes of this effort can be found
in the earliest days of the Republic, and the strategy has become
increasingly prominent in modem times. 10 Urban police chiefs identified
handgun violence as the driving force in America's violent crime surge in
the 1970s and 1980s. 11 Municipal policymakers reacted aggressively,
enacting strict licensing regimes and handgun prohibitions. 12
Strict gun regulations are designed to prevent violent crimes, like
homicide and robbery, by empowering police to detect and deter public
handgun carrying. Seeking to prevent incipient street crimes, officers stop
people who appear to be armed-including those acting otherwise
lawfully--citing suspicion of unlawful gun possession as the basis for the
intrusion. 13 This form of gun policing drove the infamous New York City
"stop and frisk" program; in the forms documenting the hundreds of
thousands of stops conducted in the city in recent years, officers most
frequently cited suspected "weapons possession" as the justification for a
stop. 14
Dramatic changes in the nation's substantive gun laws erode the
constitutional underpinnings of urban gun policing. The Fourth

9. See Jef!Tey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness
of New York City "Stop and Frisk," 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1500-20 (2014) (chronicling evolution of
New York City Stop and Frisk); sources cited infra notes II, 32.
10. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 85 (2013) (arguing that "perhaps
no characteristic of gun control in the United States is as 'longstanding' as the stricter regulation of
guns in cities than in rural areas" and providing examples); Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms
Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1695, 1726 (20 12) ("A broad range of restrictions on the use of arms in public, including bans on the
right to carry in public, emerged in the decades after the adoption of the Second Amendment.").
II. See, e.g., RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI & WILLIAM J. BRAITON, POLICE STRATEGY NO. I:
GEITING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK 4 (1994) ("In 1960, there were 75 homicides
committed in the city with handguns, representing a quarter of the total number of murders for the
year. In 1992, there were I ,500 homicides ... committed with handguns, representing three quarters of
the total number of murders ...."); see also ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 17 (2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdVhtus8008.pdf (reflecting percentage of homicides from 1980 to
2008 that involved guns); Jef!Tey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry,
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 470 (2000) ("Homicide trends in
New York City since 1985 provided strong empirical support for emphasizing gun violence in
enforcement policy.").
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part LB.
14. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 1500-20 (describing evolution of New York City Stop and Frisk);
see also infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Amendment generally requires police to possess "individualized
suspicion" of a crime prior to conducting any search or seizure. 15 When
police try to preempt violent crime by stopping (i.e., seizing) armed
citizens, the assumed violation of municipal gun laws supplies the
requisite Fourth Amendment authority. 16 As gun carrying becomes both
lawful and common, even in major cities, police lose the ability to invoke
public gun possession as a Fourth-Amendment-satisfying basis for
investigation. 17
The emerging reality across America, including its cities, is that
carrying a concealed handgun is a perfectly "lawful act." 18 In Florida
alone, the number of active concealed handgun carrying ("concealed
carry") licenses climbed from 33,000 in 1988 to just over 1.4 million in
2015-covering roughly eight percent of Floridians. 19 The most recent
estimate of active concealed carry licenses across America places the
number at over 11 million (up from 4.6 million in 2007), or almost five
percent of the population. 20 These ballooning numbers will eventually
force judges (and police officers) to acknowledge that gun possession
alone is a constitutionally dubious justification for a search or seizure. In
light of the resurgent Second Amendment's softening of gun restrictions,
urban police long trained to spring into action at the sight of a firearm may
now be violating the Fourth Amendment when they do so. 21 Once seen as
a lawful basis for searches and seizures, reports and observations of armed
people, whether in the District of Columbia's pedestrian mall or the local

15. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (stating that "some quantum
of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure").
16. See infra Part li.C.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See, e.g., Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[C]arrying a concealed
weapon pursuant to a valid concealed carry permit is a lawful act.").
19. DIV. OF LICENSING, FLA. DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND CONSUMER SERVS., NUMBER OF VALID
FLORIDA CONCEALED WEAPON LICENSES (20 15), available a/ http://www.freshfromflorida.com/
content/download/7504/118881/NumberDfValidCWLicenses_ FiscalY earEndSince 1987-1988.pdf (noting
total number of valid licenses as reported at the end of each fiscal year since 1988).
20. CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR., CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES 4-5 (2014), available at http://crimepreventionresearchcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/Concealed-Carry-Permit-Holders-Across-the-United-States.pdf; cf U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-717, GUN CONTROL: STATES' LAWS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR
CONCEALED CARRY PERMITS VARY ACROSS THE NATION I (2012)[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting
that States reported "approximately 8 million active concealed carry permits" as of December 31,
2011, but emphasizing that this "number is likely understated" because some states provided no
estimate of permits issued); PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. Goss, THE GUN DEBATE 22, 107 (2014)
(noting 8 million statistic without citation but labeling it "very conservative").
21. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 785 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (6th Cir. 2015)
(ruling that police officer, responding to 911 call, who stopped person carrying a handgun could be
liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Fourth Amendment).
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shopping mall, may increasingly be met with shrugs from police officers
who, legally speaking, have no basis to act.
America is engaged in two great debates: one regarding the proper
limits of police efforts to proactively suppress crime, and another about
the proper role of firearms in public. 22 This Article demonstrates that these
debates, while generally conducted in isolation, are closely intertwined. It
does so in three parts, roughly delineating the past, present, and future.
Part I (the past) describes the traditional gun-policing tactics employed by
urban police forces to suppress violent crime. Part II (the present) explains
how the transforming gun-rights landscape undermines the Fourth
Amendment validity of these staples of gun-oriented policing. Part III (the
future) analyzes legal strategies that cities will likely turn to as courts and
legislators increasingly invalidate restrictive gun laws. This final Part
forecasts that local policymakers will try to suppress gun carrying and
detect and deter unlawful gun possession by: (1) raising the minimum age
for obtaining a "concealed carry" license; and (2) requiring lawfully armed
citizens to present their license, upon request, to inquiring police officers.
These efforts to reduce the number of lawful gun possessors and facilitate
the detection and disarming of unlicensed gun possessors could approach
the effectiveness of traditional urban gun-policing efforts because licensed
gun possessors commit only a tiny fraction of violent street crime. 23 As
Part III explains, however, these approaches are themselves subject to
constitutional challenge and may generate unintended negative policy
consequences, such as abusive police practices and racial profiling.Z4 The
discussion ultimately raises as many questions as it answers, but one
theme resonates throughout: the emerging Second and Fourth Amendment
"right to remain armed" has the potential to radically transform American
policing.

22. See Bellin, supra note 9 (discussing controversy surrounding New York City Stop and Frisk);
Jeffrey Bellin, What We Should Learn from Garner and Ferguson Cases, CNN (Dec. 9, 2014, 10:32
AM), http://www.cnn.com/20 14/12/08/opinion/bellin-prosecutors-killings-by-police/index.html?hpt=
hp_tl (addressing controversy surrounding recent police deadly force cases); sources cited supra notes
2-3 (discussing controversy surrounding gun control proposals).
23. See infra Part lli.A.
24. See infra Part lli.B.2.
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URBAN GUN POLICING

City residents absorb a fearsome and disproportionate share of
America's gun crime, often in the form of robberies and murder. 25
Municipal efforts to combat these crimes target firearms, and particularly
handguns.Z 6 One of the most vivid examples of this focus emerged in New
York City in 1993 when voters, reacting to a cresting street crime
epidemic, elected Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who installed William Bratton
as Police Commissioner.Z 7 Bratton crunched the numbers and determined
that handguns were the principal driver ofNew York City's crime wave. 28
The first policy document promulgated by Bratton's police department
(the "NYPD"), Police Strategy No. 1: Getting Guns off the Streets of New
York, reported that between 1960 and 1992, the city experienced an almost
two-thousand percent increase in homicides committed with handguns (a
type of homicide that had grown from one quarter to three quarters of all

25. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Urban
areas such as Chicago suffer disproportionately from this epidemic of violence. Handguns contribute
disproportionately to it."); DETIS T. DUHART, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 182031, URBAN,
SUBURBAN, AND RURAL VICTIMIZATION, 1993-98 4, 9 (2000), available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf7usrv98.pdf (reporting that urban residents were victimized by violent crime 74% more
often than rural residents and 37% more often than suburbanites and that "[u]rban violent offenders
were more likely than offenders elsewhere (12% urban versus 9% suburban and 8% rural) to use a
firearm"); Blocher, supra note 10, at 100 (explaining that "though the empirics are messy and
contested, gun crime is clearly an urban problem" and discussing empirical evidence); CDC, ViolenceRelated Firearm Deaths Among Residents of Metropolitan Areas and Cities-United States, 20062007, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 573, 574 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6018.pdf (concluding based on empirical analysis that "firearm homicide rates
tended to be higher with increasing urbanization").
26. See Brief of Violence Policy Center and the Police Chiefs for the Cities of Los Angeles,
Minneapolis, and Seattle as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 136348 (representing views of "the Chiefs of Police for
three of the nation's largest cities: Los Angeles, Seattle, and Minneapolis" who "are keenly aware of
the devastation caused by handguns in American cities" and "have a substantial interest in enacting
and upholding handgun restrictions in order to protect the lives of their citizens and their officers");
GEORGE L. KELLING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 178259, "BROKEN WINDOWS" AND POLICE
DISCRETION 9 (1999) ("Increasingly, police are under renewed and constant pressure from
neighborhood groups and city halls across the country ... to 'do something now' about ... getting
guns off the street, and regaining control over public places."); Jon S. Vernick et al., Technologies to
Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth Amendment Limits on a New Public Health and Law Enforcement
Tool, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 567, 567 (2003) ("In the 1980s and 1990s, police departments across the
country began to develop and implement strategies to address illegal weapons carrying. Often these
strategies have involved aggressive efforts to identifY and physically search individuals suspected of
illegally carrying a firearm.").
27. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER 47-48 (2001) (indicating that "Giuliani
appointed William Bratton police commissioner in December 1993," soon after Giuliani was elected);
WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TuRNAROUND 194-95 (1998) (describing process of being
hired to head NYPD in December 1993 to January 1994).
28. BRATTON, supra note 27, at 218.

8

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1

city murders).Z 9 The strategy document concluded that "[i]llegal gunsparticularly handguns-are an unrelenting and growing plague in New
York." 30 This insight forecasted the NYPD's subsequent policing
strategies. Over the next decades, the NYPD engaged in a concerted effort
to rid the streets of handguns, employing specialized units tasked with
seizing firearms, mass stop-and-frisk, pretextual arrests, and other
measures-all intended to detect and deter public gun possession and
"get[] guns off the streets."31 While New York City's efforts received the
most attention, they differed only in degree from those of American cities
across the country. 32 This Part summarizes the legal framework that
undergirds urban gun-suppression efforts-a framework that, as explained
in Part II, may no longer be constitutional in light of sweeping changes to
the nation's gun laws.

A. Strict Licensing Regimes
Efforts to keep guns off city streets begin with laws restricting public
gun possession. American cities traditionally employed two approaches:
prohibitions and licensing. Although prohibitions are all but extinct, they
previously formed the backbone of urban gun-policing efforts in two
major American cities. Most prominently, starting in the late 1970s and for
decades thereafter, the District of Columbia essentially prohibited
handguns after determining that the city's licensing regime had "not been
sufficiently effective in reducing the potentiality of gun-related deaths and

29. GIULIANI & BRATTON, supra note II, at 4.
30. Jd. at 4-5 ("[New Yorkers] are afraid for a reason, and that reason has mainly to do with
handguns.").
31. See id.; Bellin, supra note 9, at 1500-20 (chronicling evolution of New York City Stop and
Frisk).
32. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Introduction: Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 43 ARIZ.
L. REV. 261, 262 (2001) ("Urban police departments are pursuing gun-oriented policing strategies
focused on increased stop-and-frisk encounters and misdemeanor arrests as a way to get guns off the
streets."); Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
SCI. 335, 339 (2014) (explaining that "[s]cores of cities rushed to follow the Kansas City model [of
gun-oriented policing], including perhaps most famously, New York City"); Lawrence W. Sherman, In
Remembrance: James Wilford Shaw, Criminologist, THE CRIMINOLOGIST (AM. Soc'v OF
CRIMINOLOGY, Columbus, OH), Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 23 (emphasizing Shaw's influence by stating as
"[a] conservative estimate" that "over 100 other police agencies adopted" aggressive gun interdiction
efforts modeled on Shaw's empirical findings in Kansas City); Gus G. Sentementes, Police Step up
Frisking Tactic, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 13, 2005), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-ll-13/news/
0511130098 I frisking-deter-crime-police-officers/3 (reporting on aggressive stop and frisk tactics in
high crime a~ of Baltimore intended to "seize guns and prevent violence").
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gun-related crimes from occurring within the District of Columbia."33 In
1983, Chicago similarly banned handguns to "protect its residents 'from
the loss of property and injury or death from firearms. "' 34 Other cities,
such as San Francisco, attempted to ban handguns at various points in their
history with limited success. 35
More commonly, cities limit public gun possession by restricting
visible weapons carrying ("open carry") and prohibiting the carrying of
concealed handguns without a "concealed carry" permit issued by local
police authorities. 36 By giving local officials, such as the police
commissioner, broad discretion to deny permits, states allow cities to
severely limit public gun possession even as less crime-plagued rural areas
freely allow licensed handgun carrying. 37
Against a backdrop of "open carry" prohibitions in their respective
states, New York City and San Diego exemplify the strict licensing model
of gun control. To carry a concealed handgun in New York City, an
applicant must demonstrate "proper cause" to the NYPD. 38 The standard is
stringent: "the mere fact that an applicant has been the victim of a crime or
resides in or is employed in a 'high crime area,' does not establish 'proper
cause' for the issuance of a carry or special handgun license."39 Instead,

33. Mcintosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 754 (D.C. 1978) (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 94TH CONG., REP. ON THE JUDICIARY & CRIM. LAW (Comm. Print
1976)).
34. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2010) (quoting city council
proceedings).
35. Fiscal v. City of San Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 335-36 (Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating
San Francisco ordinance as preempted by state law); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 938 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "some municipalities ban handguns, even in States that constitutionally protect
the right to bear arms," and citing examples); Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District
of Columbia v. Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 145-46 (2009)
("At least ten municipalities, including San Francisco, Oakland, Chicago and many of its neighboring
municipalities, Memphis, Toledo, and Cambridge, have at least at one time enacted handgun
regulations comparable to those of the District.").
36. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2014) (detailing
California firearm licensing rules); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03(3) (2014) (prohibiting an unlicensed
person from "possess[ing] any loaded firearm" outside of the home or place of business). These laws
have a lengthy pedigree. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) ("In
1881, New York prohibited the concealed carrying of 'any kind of fire-arms."').
37. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT.§ 2C:58-4(c) (2000) (requiring concealed carry license to be issued
by "the chief police officer of the municipality in which the applicant resides"); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.00(1 0) (20 14) (defining pertinent licensing officers under New York law).
38. N.Y. C., N.Y., RULES tit. 38, § 5-03 (2014), available at http://rules.cityofuewyork.us/content/
section-5-03-carry-and-special-handgun-licenses; see also Sanchez v. Kelly, 799 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup.
Ct. 2004) (unpublished table disposition) (describing NYPD's "[e]xtraordinary power" in issuing
concealed carry permits); Goldstein v. Brown, 592 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (App. Div. 1993) (reviewing
concealed carry permit denial and describing broad discretion provided to NYPD decisions).
39. § 5-03.
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the NYPD requires evidence of "[e]xposure of the applicant to
extraordinary personal danger, documented by proof of recurrent threats to
life or safety requiring authorization to carry a handgun. " 40 The NYPD
rarely grants concealed carry licenses. 41
San Diego similarly restricts issuance of concealed carry licenses to
applicants showing "good cause," defined as "[a] set of circumstances that
distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be
placed in harm's way"; concern for "one's personal safety alone is not
considered good cause.'.42 San Diego County delegates the determination
of whether this standard is met to the County Sheriff. 43 Under the policy,
there are about 1100 active concealed weapons permits in San Diego,
representing slightly more than .03% of the population.44 California's
other major cities are reportedly even more restrictive: as of March 2014,
"Los Angeles County had a few hundred [active concealed weapons
permits], while counties in the Bay Area each have fewer than 200, with
San Francisco clocking in with just two.'.4 5

B. Detecting Noncompliance
Laws prohibiting or severely restricting public gun possession do not
enforce themselves. Consequently, urban policymakers expect police
officers to seek out guns and arrest those who carry them unlawfully. The
mechanisms for performing this task vary. This Part catalogues the most
commonly employed tactics. As discussed in Part II, the recent expansion

40. Jd.
41. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 953 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting
that "New York City rarely [issues permits] and so has been characterized as maintaining a virtual ban
on handguns"); CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 20, at 10, 13 (reporting that New
York City had 5700 active permits as of2010, or .09% of the population); Sewell Chan, Annie Hall,
Get Your Gun, N.Y. TiMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Dec. 2, 2008, 1:13 PM), http://cityroom.biogs.
nytimes.com/2008/12/02/a-guide-to-city-gun-licenses/?_r=O (providing breakdown of concealed carry
permit numbers for New York City and noting mayor's desire to reduce the number); John Marzulli,
Gun Permits KOD NYPD Shoots Down 55% Of Renewals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 4, 1999, 12:00
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/gun-permits-kod-nypd-shoots-55-renewals-article1.835934 (detailing difficulty of obtaining a concealed carry license in New York City and the low
number of permits issued).
42. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
43. Jd.
44. Randy Dotinga, 5 Things to Know About Concealed Guns in SD, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Mar.
7, 2014 ), http://voiceofsandiego.org/20 14/03/07/5-things-to-know-about-concealed-guns-in-sd/. About
3.2 million people live in San Diego County. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: San
Diego County, California, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06073.html (last
visited Aug. I 0, 20 15).
45. Dotinga, supra note 44.
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of gun rights calls into question the constitutionality of these gun-policing
tactics. Interestingly, the most significant impact of changing gun laws
may be on a tactic yet to see widespread adoption, but perhaps most
important to future generations: gun-detection technology.
1. Observations, Tips, and Admissions
Police often detect guns through public observation. Officers patrol the
streets alert to signs of gun possession, such as bulges under clothing or
protruding handles. The late Jack Maple, a key Bratton deputy, describes
in his memoir how he taught himself to "spot people carrying guns" so he
could "save a few lives" by getting the guns off the street. 46 Maple
explained the "drill" as follows: after seeing a suspicious bulge, he would
make his "first move by grabbing the handle of [the suspect's] gun. [The
suspect] freezes and usually obeys an order to put his hands on his head. If
he doesn't, my hold on his gun and waistband put him off-balance, so I
can spin him around and get cuffs on him anyway. ,,47 Maple bragged that
as a patrol officer, he would "stop two or three people a day who were
carrying concealed weapons.',48
Police also receive reports from citizens about guns carried by others.
A Seventh Circuit case provides a representative fact pattern:
One afternoon a uniformed police officer on patrol in his car . . .
received a message from his dispatcher conveying an anonymous
tip that at the comer of Main and Calhoun Streets was a black man
wearing a tan shirt and tan shorts who had a gun in his waistband. 49

46. JACK MAPLE, THE CRIME FIGHTER 42 (1999).
47. !d.
48. !d. Maple notes that "[m]any of the guns were licensed; some were not." !d.; cf Timothy
McVeigh Trial: Documents Relating to McVeigh's Arrest and the Search of His Vehicle, UMKC,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcveigh!mcveigharrest.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Testimony of Oklahoma State Trooper Hanger] (providing a copy of the transcript of the
testimony of Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger discussing his stop of Timothy McVeigh
when he noticed a "bulge under McVeigh's left arm"; after McVeigh said he had a gun, the trooper
testified that he "grabbed for the bulge," "removed [his] pistol from [his] holster and stuck it to the
back of[McVeigh's] head"); United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1546 (D. Colo. 1996)
(discussing stop).
49. United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding subsequent stop); see
also United States v. Shaw, 874 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D. Mass. 2012) (reporting confidential informant
tip that "he had seen the two men [subsequently stopped by police] with the gun"); In re D.M., 781
A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001) (evaluating Philadelphia stop initiated by "an anonymous telephone call
reporting that appellant was on a specific comer with a gun" and deeming Terry stop constitutional
when suspect fled upon approach of police).
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A similar anonymous tip formed the prelude to a Supreme Court case,
where police responded to a tip that a person "standing at a particular bus
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun."50
Another gun-detection tactic takes advantage of case law that deems
"consensual encounters" unregulatec by the Fourth Amendment. 51 Under
this doctrine, officers can freely initiate conversations with anyone they
encounter. During these conversations the police commonly inquire
whether the person is armed. 52 If the person chooses to answer and the
answer is "yes," officers have detected a weapon. If the answer is "no," the
officer may ask and obtain permission to do a quick "pat down" search.
After all, the officers will say, if you are not armed, as you claim, why
object to a pat down? 53 No Fourth Amendment violation occurs in this
scenario so long as a court rules that the subject of the encounter
voluntarily agreed to stop, talk, and be frisked. 54

50. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); see also Stephanie Clifford, In Brooklyn Gun
Cases, Suspicion Turns to the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. II, 2014, at A26 (discussing series of
suspicious cases where officers based arrests on a confidential informer's tip that someone was
armed). Often, the tip of gun possession is not anonymous. See, e.g., United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d
1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) ("An employee of the local utility company, Arizona Public Service
(" APS"), reported to mall personnel that he observed a man (later identified as Orman) place a
handgun in his boot before entering the mall."); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 352 (3d Cir.
2000) (upholding subsequent stop where "a young black man in his early twenties flagged [police]
down and explained that he had just seen a man with a gun").
51. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("As long as the person to whom
questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion
upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and
objective justification."); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (same); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) ("[A) search authorized by consent is wholly valid.").
52. See sources cited infra note 53.
53. See Mitchell v. United States, 233 F. App'x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that once
suspect being questioned near the location of shots being fired "acknowledged that he had a weapon
on him," the officers "were not only entitled to investigate further, but also to ensure their safety in the
process by removing the gun"); United States v. McKinnon, 133 F. App'x 167, 169 (6th Cir. 2005)
(upholding gun seizure where officer patrolling housing project obtained pedestrian's permission to do
a pat down and found a gun); United States v. Williams, 215 F.3d 1323 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
table disposition) (upholding legality of officer's discovery of gun by asking suspect, Lawrence
Marcell Williams, if he could search him and, after suspect indicated acquiescence, finding gun in
suspect's jacket).
54. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35 (citations omitted) ("[E]ven when officers have no basis for
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine
the individual's identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage-as long as the police
do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.").
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2. Coercive Encounters
In most cases, people unlawfully carrying guns are discreet, foiling the
direct gun-detection techniques described in the prior part. As a result,
police interested in detecting and deterring public gun carrying must take
more proactive measures. The most common techniques can be broken
down by the legal doctrines that authorize them: pretextual arrests and
Terry stop and frisks. 55
When police possess "probable cause" to suspect a criminal offense has
been committed, they can constitutionally arrest the offender and perform
a search incident to arrest. 56 This rule applies regardless of the subjective
intent of the officer or the seriousness of the offense. 57 As a consequence,
police who have probable cause to suspect even relatively minor offenses,
such as traffic infractions, jaywalking, drug possession, or trespassing, can
leverage the minor offense into a search of the person, even if the actual
motivation for the search is a speculative hope of detecting unlawful gun
possession. Taking advantage of this doctrine, officers regularly
investigate and detect gun possession through searches legally justified by
suspicion of common, sometimes trivial, offenses. 58 Thus, New York City

55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20-22 (1968).
56. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) ("[W]arrantless arrests for crimes
committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and ... while
States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth
Amendment's protections."); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."); Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001).
57. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."); United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531,541
(6th Cir. 2008) ("[A] seizure for an ongoing violation of any crime~no matter how minor~is
governed by the standard of reasonable suspicion .... ");Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions
and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. I
(2011) (critiquing the Supreme Court's criminal procedure doctrine for failing to consider crime
severity in the Fourth Amendment calculus).
58. See United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reporting testimony of
officer that "the [Washington, D.C.,] police were performing an 'aggressive traffic patrol'~looking
'for moving violations, tag violations, reasons to pull vehicles over'-because, as Officer Teixeira
testified, 'that's normally how we get a lot of our narcotics and gun arrests,"' but emphasizing the
irrelevance of the true motive for the traffic stop); I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and
Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 869 (2008) (describing findings of the Mollen Commission that suggested
the New York City police officers who believed a suspect might be carrying a gun would make up a
pretextual reason for a stop and search, such as that '"they saw a bulge in a person's pocket"'); Eric
Pooley & Elaine Rivera, One Good Apple, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54 (reporting on Maple's desire to
"go after shootings" and his suggestion that confronting people for minor violations like having an
open beer or public urination can lead to frisks~"'[m]aybe I bump against that bulge in your belt'"~
that uncover weapons).
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police officers could arrest someone "they observed ... riding his bicycle
on the sidewalk," a potential violation of the city's Administrative Code;
their discovery of an unlicensed firearm in the search that followed
constituted "a lawful search incident to a proper seizure."59 Similarly,
Columbia, Missouri, police could arrest someone for trespassing and rely
on a handgun found in the search incident to arrest to support a subsequent
firearm charge. 60
Even when an officer does not possess probable cause to suspect an
offense, the Fourth Amendment (as interpreted by the courts) permits a
brief stop and cursory search based upon a lower level of suspicion.
Specifically, under Terry v. Ohio, an officer may "conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot." 61 A "frisk" may follow if there is
reasonable suspicion to believe the person is armed and dangerous. 62
Again, there is no requirement that the suspected offense be violent or
serious. 63 As explained by the late Bill Stuntz, this means that "Terry's
requirements are easily met. Reasonable suspicion may mean little more
than being a young man in a high-crime neighborhood on a street comer
where drug deals are thought to happen. " 64 The doctrine permits, for
example, Tulsa police to stop a person based on "reasonable suspicion"
that he was violating a city ordinance that prohibits ''walk[ ing] in the road
when there is a sidewalk available for pedestrian use," and rely on the gun
found in the pat down that followed to support a later firearm
prosecution. 65
Like pretextual arrests, Terry stops provide a viable mechanism for
motivated police officers to seek out unlawful gun possession.

59. United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198,204 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding search as described
above as a valid search incident to arrest).
60. United States v. Griffith, 533 F.3d 979, 985 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding search as described
above); cf BRATTON, supra note 27, at 154 (explaining an "unanticipated by-product" of fare-evader
sweeps instituted under a "Broken Windows" paradigm in the New York subways was that stops for
fare evasion uncovered unlawful weapons).
61. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that "(i]n Terry, we held that an
officer may ... conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion tbat criminal activity is afoot," and that this is "a less demanding standard than probable
cause"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30 (1968).
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
63. David Keenan & Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity Model for Stop-and-Frisks, 123
YALE L.J. 1448, 1458 & n.60 (2014) (stating that "lower courts routinely uphold stop-and-frisks for
even tbe most minor offenses so long as an officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion" and citing
cases supporting tbis assertion).
64. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, Ill YALE L.J. 2137, 2170 (2002).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Birmingham, No. 13-CR-0237-CVE, 2014 WL 580138, at *4
(N.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2014).

2015]

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN ARMED

15

Presumably, this was the legal hook for Jack Maple's daily, coercive gun
stops based only on the sight of a suspicious bulge. 66 Following Maple's
example, in the hundreds of thousands of stop-and-frisks documented by
the NYPD, officers most often list "weapons possession" as the suspected
crime. 67 Taking full advantage of Terry's applicability to all offenses,
officers also frequently cited "trespassing" as a basis for gun-seeking
stops. 68

3. Gun-Detecting Technology
Gun-detecting technologies present an appealing alternative to
intrusive and potentially discriminatory investigative techniques, such as
pretextual arrests and "stop and frisks." These technologies already exist
and, as they mature, may allow police to scan crowds for firearms without
the public outcry and (perhaps) constitutional obstacles occasioned by
practices such as "stop and frisk. "69
Portable weapons scanners head the list of technologies with the
greatest potential for urban policing. 70 The NYPD recently obtained a
prototype scanner that can reveal concealed weapons by passively
detecting background radiation differentials. 71 While scanners in their

66. See discussion supra Part 1.8.1.
67. OFFICE OF MGMT. ANALYSIS AND PLANNING, NYPD, 2011 REASONABLE SUSPICION STOPS 4
(2012) (25.6% of all stops); OFFICE OF MGMT. ANALYSIS AND PLANNING, NYPD, 2012 REASONABLE
SUSPICION STOPS 4 (2013) (24.3% of all stops), available at http://www.nyc.govlhtml/nypdlhtml/
analysis_and_planning/reports.shtml.
68. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing an NYPD
stop based on "criminal trespass"); Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at AI (describing NYPD's heavy reliance on minor violations, particularly
violations of rules governing public housing projects, to justifY stops).
69. W.R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2(b) (3d ed. West 2014) ("Recent
developments in concealed weapons detection technology will likely produce a variety of equipment
which police will soon have available to detect weapons on persons or in other locations."); Vernick et
al., supra note 26, at 567 ("Devices currently being developed and tested could permit the police to
scan an individual from a distance-much as a hand-held radar gun enables the speed of a vehicle to
be determined from a distance-to determine if a firearm is being carried under his or her clothing.").
70. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 20, 1994, at 47,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/magazine!just-take-away-their-guns.html?page wanted
~I ("What is needed is a device that will enable the police to detect the presence of a large lump of
metal in someone's pocket from a distance of 10 or 15 feet.").
71. Rocco Parascandola, NYPD Commissioner Says Department Will Begin Testing a New HighTech Device that Scans for Concealed Weapons, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:27 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-readies-scan-and-fiisk-article-1.1245663 (reporting that
the NYPD ')ust received a machine that reads terahertz-the natural energy emitted by people and
inanimate objects-and allows police to view concealed weapons from a distance" and explaining that
the device "is small enough to be placed in a police vehicle"); Tamer EI-Ghobashy, Police Tool
Targets Guns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles!SBIOOOI42
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current iteration can be deployed in patrol cars, departments are working
toward models that would be "small enough to carry on an officer's gun
belt."72 As the technology improves, patrol officers could scan for guns
from cars or while on foot in populated areas; authorities could also place
scanners on fixed observation posts alongside proliferating surveillance
cameras. 73 Although their constitutionality has not been tested, these
devices could potentially permit officers to detect firearm carriers without
stopping ("seizing") or frisking ("searching") anyone. Like radar devices
used to determine the speed of passing vehicles, the scans would often be
conducted without the subjects ever knowing they had taken place. Other
forms of "technology," including dogs trained to sniff guns (or more
precisely gun powder), can also be employed for the purpose of nonintrusive gun detection. 74 As the next Part chronicles, all of these methods
of gun detection are called into question by the recent expansion of
Second Amendment rights.
II.

SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO GUN POLICING

Parallel American norms of a robust, rural gun culture and strict, urban
gun control have coexisted uneasily for centuries. 75 In recent years, the
gun culture has gained the upper hand, methodically knocking down
longstanding urban gun restrictions through legislative and judicial action.
This Part illustrates these changes to substantive gun law and explores
their Fourth Amendment implications.

4127887323539804578260261579068182 (describing portable scanners being developed for NYPD
and noting that "police aimed to get the T-Ray technology in a device small enough to carry on an
officer's gun belt").
72. El-Ghobashy, supra note 71.
73. "[T]he New York City Police Department already has access to about 2,000 surveillance
cameras on the island of Manhattan alone." Ken Hanly, New York City Police Eye Drones for
Surveillance Purposes, DIGITAL J. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/ 341541,
archived at http://penna.cc/35WP-ZHIA.
74. Danielle E. Gaines, County Police Introduce Gun-Sniffing Dogs, WASH. POST (Nov. 23,
2011 ), https://www. washingtonpost.com/locaVcounty-police-introduce-gun-sniffing-dogs/20 II/11/2 II
glQAL9ZKoN_story.html (discussing Montgomery County Police Department's "firearm-detecting
dogs").
75. Blocher, supra note 10, at 90-103 (describing "two cultures"); Peterson v. Martinez, 707
F.3d 1197, 1211 (lOth Cir. 2013) (collecting historical and scholarly sources demonstrating "the long
history of concealed carry restrictions in this country"); NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[E]ven before the Revolution, gun use
and gun control have been inextricably intertwined.").
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A. Handgun Regulation Under Siege
The substantive laws undergirding urban gun policing are being
hollowed out on two fronts. First, courts are scrutinizing gun regulations
with renewed vigor after District of Columbia v. Heller. Second, state
legislatures are preempting municipal gun regulations, requiring cities to
allow public firearm possession irrespective of court intervention. The
upshot of both of these changes, sometimes operating in tandem, is a
steady trend of loosening gun restrictions.

1. Legislative Easing of Gun Regulation
State legislatures steadily eased gun restrictions over the past decade.
In June 2002, seven states and the District of Columbia prohibited the
concealed carrying of handguns. 76 Today, no such bans remain. 77 While
American cities continue to restrict firearm carrying through licensing
requirements, these licensing regimes are also under siege. States are
steadily migrating from "no-issue" (i.e., no concealed carry permits) to
"may-issue" (i.e., permits issued at the discretion of a police chief); from
"may-issue" to "shall-issue" (i.e., permits must be issued to any qualified
applicant); and from "shall-issue" to not requiring a permit at all. 78
Between 2002 and 2012, the number of "shall issue" states climbed from
twenty-nine to thirty-nine, and the number of states where permits are
unnecessary to carry a concealed firearm quadrupled from one to four? 9
The steady erosion of gun regulations impacts even cities whose
citizens favor strict gun control. State law trumps municipal ordinances,
and consequently state lawmakers can easily override local gun control
preferences. 80 Philadelphia regularly tries to impose gun restrictions
analogous to those of other American cities. The Pennsylvania courts

76. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 tbl.l, 9 fig. I (lllinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Ohio, and Wisconsin).
77. See discussion infra Part ll.A.
78. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 tbi.I; Yourish et al., supra note 3.
79. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 tbi.I (noting three fewer states in the "shall-issue" chart
due to move to no permit required); see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 441 (3d Cir. 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (cataloguing state gun laws).
80. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 713 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
"as many as 41 States may pre-empt local gun regulation"); Blocher, supra note 10, at 100, 133
(noting that "most states preempt some or all local gun control" and describing "dramatic change" in
the past three decades of preemption of local gun control autonomy); Matt Valentine, Disarmed: How
Cities Are Losing the Power to Regulate Guns, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archi ve/20 14/03/disarmed-how-cities-are-losing-the-power-to-regulate-guns/284 220/ (describing
the NRA's successful, nationwide effort to push states to preempt local gun control laws).
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express empathy, but consistently strike down the restrictions: "[w]hile we
understand the terrible problems gun violence poses for the city and
sympathize with its efforts to use its police powers to create a safe
environment for its citizens, these practical considerations do not alter the
clear preemption imposed by the [Pennsylvania] legislature .... " 81 This
pattern plays out in cities across the country, with recent examples from
Atlanta, 82 Cleveland, 83 Phoenix, 84 and San Francisco. 85

2. Judicial Invalidation of Gun Restrictions
Municipalities located in states where legislatures continue to favor
strict gun laws face challenges from the judiciary. While the constitutional
validity of restrictive urban licensing regimes remained unquestioned for
most of American history, this changed in 2008, when the Supreme Court
held in Heller that "the [District of Columbia]'s ban on handgun
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment." 86 Although
Heller limited its precise holding to the Capitol's ban on in-home guns, the
Court's recognition of an individual right to handgun possession for self-

81. Clarke v. House of Representatives, 957 A.2d 361, 365 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008); see also
Ortiz v. Pennsylvania, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. 1996) ("The constitution does not provide that the right
to bear arms shall not be questioned in any part of the commonwealth except Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh, where it may be abridged at will, but that it shall not be questioned in any part of the
commonwealth.").
82. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Roswell, 680 S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)
(noting success of gun-rights group in trial court in suit against Atlanta and other Georgia cities to
prevent them "from enforcing local ordinances that prohibited carrying firearms in city parks" as
preempted, in resolving appeal of other issues in the case); Rachel Stockman, Gun Rights Group
Targets Atlanta Gun Ordinance, WSB-TV (Jan. 17, 2013, 1:19PM), http://www.wsbtv. com/news/
news/locallgun-rights-group-targets-atlanta-gun-ordinance/nTzHm/ (reporting on GeorgiaCarry's
threat to sue "Atlanta over a local ordinance which bans weapons at 'public assemblies' like festivals
and parades" and noting that the group had "previously sued the city and won over a local ordinance
banning guns at local parks").
83. City of Cleveland v. State, 942 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ohio 2010) (upholding constitutionality of
provision against challenge by Cleveland); Bob Driehaus, Ohio Court Limits Power of Localities on
Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010, at Al5 (quoting Cleveland official warning that "gun owners
would now be able to walk through a public square with rifles, handguns and assault weapons").
84. See H.R. 2455, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) (amending Arizona lost property law,
which requires property to be sold back to the public, to include "surrendered" property); Mary Jo
Pitzl, New Arizona Gun Law Draws Outcry From Democrats, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2013, 10:49
PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130430arizona-new-gun-law-draws-democratsoutcry.html?nclick_check=l (reporting on Phoenix Police Department's scramble to salvage gun buyback program after Arizona legislature mandated that guns had to be sold back to the public).
85. Fiscal v. City of San Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 335 (Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating San
Francisco voter initiative to ban handgun possession ordinance preempted by state law).
86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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defense 87 signaled open season on gun restrictions outside the home. After
all, the need for self-defense extends beyond the front door, particularly
for city dwellers. 88 Furthermore, handguns, rather than rifles or other long
guns, are well suited to mobile protection. Following this reasoning, the
Seventh Circuit ruled in 2012 that Heller required the invalidation of
Illinois' complete prohibition of public gun carrying. 89 A federal judge in
Washington, D.C., adopted the same argument in 2014, striking down the
Capitol's ban on handguns in public. 90
The legal battle over the broader implications of Heller is ongoing,
with the opinion itself providing ammunition for both sides in the debate. 91
The Heller Court recognized that "[l]ike most rights, the right secured by
the Second Amendment is not unlimited"92 and that "the majority of the
19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or
state analogues."93 Picking up on these cues, the Second Circuit in
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester rejected a post-Heller challenge to
New York's restriction of concealed carry licenses to individuals
demonstrating "proper cause."94 The court concluded that New York's
limits implicate the Second Amendment, but nonetheless survive
constitutional scrutiny because "[r]estricting handgun possession in public
to those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a lawful purpose is
substantially related to New York's interests in public safety and crime

87. /d. at 628 ("[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment
right.").
88. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a Second
Amendment right to cany a gun for self-defense logically extends beyond the home).
89. /d. at 942 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit noted that "Illinois is the only state that
maintains a flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home." /d. at 940; cf People v. Aguilar,
2 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013) ("[I]f Heller means what it says, and 'individual self-defense' is indeed
'the central component' of the second amendment right to keep and bear arms, then it would make
little sense to restrict that right to the home.").
90. Ruling on Summary Judgment at 3-4, 15, Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. I :09-cv01482-FJS (D.D.C. July 2014) (describing D.C. framework prohibiting public handgun possession and
noting that "[t]he District of Columbia appears to be the only jurisdiction that still has such a complete
ban on the canying of ready-to-use handguns outside the home"); Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (recognizing
the District of Columbia as the sole remaining jurisdiction with a handgun cany prohibition analogous
to the one the court subsequently struck down).
91. Cf Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) ("It remains unsettled whether the
individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home."); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 860--61, 887 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that arguments
against gun restrictions "are much less compelling when applied outside the home" and noting that
"[t]he historical case for regulation is likewise stronger outside the home").
92. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
93. /d.; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (reiterating these "assurances") (plurality opinion).
94. 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012); see supra Part LA (discussing "proper cause" standard).
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prevention."95 The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 2013,
rejecting a challenge to New Jersey's analogous "justifiable need"
requirement for obtaining a concealed carry license. 96
More recently, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
Peruta v. County of San Diego, where frustrated applicants challenged San
Diego's implementation of California's requirement that citizens show
"good cause" to obtain a concealed carry license. 97 The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that state law prohibited open carrying of handguns, leaving
concealed carry as the only option for citizens seeking to carry handguns
in public. 98 Yet the "good cause" requirement, as interpreted by San Diego
(and other California cities), made concealed carry permits unavailable to
San Diegans with only a generic desire for self-defense. The court
analogized this near-total infringement on these citizens' right to "bear"
arms to the near-total infringement on the right to "keep" arms invalidated
in Heller, and thus struck down San Diego's licensing regime. 99 The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged the tradition of concealed carry prohibitions, but
situated that prohibition in a historical context of widespread open firearm
possession. 100 The post-Heller Second Amendment may not require open
carry or concealed carry, the Ninth Circuit explained, but it "does require
that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the
home." 101
While the Supreme Court showed initial interest in resolving the
Circuit split described above (distributing the New Jersey case three times
for discussion at its conference before finally denying certiorari), it
ultimately declined to intervene, suggesting that a resolution may be

95. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98.
96. Fi/ko, 724 F.3d at 433, 440 (noting that New Jersey presents a "close analogue" to "New
York's permit schema" and concluding that "even if the 'justifiable need' standard" burdens the
Second Amendment, "it nonetheless withstands intermediate scrutiny and is therefore constitutional").
97. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014).
98. /d. at 1171 (explaining that California's gun regulatory "scheme as a whole violates the
Second Amendment because it precludes a responsible, law-abiding citizen from carrying a weapon in
public for the purpose of lawful self-defense in any manner").
99. /d. at 1170, 1172 (noting that "Heller teaches that a near-total prohibition on keeping arms
(Heller) is hardly better than a near-total prohibition on bearing them (this case)" and consequently
"the Second Amendment does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside
the home"); cf Baker v. Kealoha, 564 F. App'x 903, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Peruta to
Hawaii's licensing scheme).
I 00. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1171-72.
101. !d. at 1172. During the final editing phases of this Article, the Ninth Circuit agreed to
reconsider the Peruta decision en bane. See 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). Whatever the results of the
reconsideration, the underlying constitutional question must inevitably be answered by the Supreme
Court.
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delayed for years. 102 When the Court finally does take up the question, it
will undoubtedly stretch Heller beyond the home. Indeed, Justice Alito's
2010 opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago 103 extending Heller to the
states to strike down Chicago's (home) handgun ban reads like a
springboard designed to propel Heller outdoors. The opinion stresses that
"in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is 'the central component'
of the Second Amendment right," and repeatedly describes the right as one
of self-defense generally without language restricting it to the home. 104
The next opinion virtually writes itself. If the Second Amendment right to
"keep" arms requires states to allow law-abiding citizens to possess
firearms in the home, the right to "bear" arms would seem to require states
to allow analogous firearm possession outside the home. Some licensing
will survive, but licensing regimes like those in New York City, San
Francisco, and Los Angeles, where ordinary law-abiding residents cannot
obtain a permit to carry a handgun in public, are in serious constitutional
jeopardy. Absent an abrupt change of course at the Supreme Court, the
future is clear. More and more Americans will be able to lawfully carry
handguns on city streets, and this pattern will play out in cities across the
country, regardless of whether a majority of the city's residents and
officials favor strict gun control. The next parts analyze the Fourth
Amendment implications of these developments for American policing.
B. Transforming Gun-Detector Scans into "Searches"
One of the least recognized, but perhaps most significant, effects of
expanding gun rights is its impact on the constitutionality of gun-detecting
technology. An expansive recognition of concealed carry rights may tum
passive gun detection into a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. This
counterintuitive implication derives from Supreme Court jurisprudence
that holds that citizens enjoy no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
"contraband." 105 As guns detected in public spaces become less likely to
constitute "contraband," courts will be unable to shrug off their detection
in any jurisdiction as constitutional non-searches.

102. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); see
also Drake v. Jerejian, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/drake-v-jerejian/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (noting distribution for conference three separate times before the petition
was denied).
103. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
104. /dat767, 780.
I 05. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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As discussed in Part I, police departments are seeking to develop viable
passive-detection technologies that reveal the presence of concealed
firearms, without the personal intrusion and dangers of a physical search.
The constitutionality of suspicion-less weapons scans turns on whether
such a scan constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. 106 This
question, in turn, depends on whether a person walking on a public street
has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the information that a gun
scan would reveal. 107 Supreme Court case law currently offers no answer
to this question. The strongest guidance comes from United States v.
Place. 108 In Place, the Supreme Court ruled that a narcotics dog's sniff of
a suspect's luggage was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment and
thus need not be preceded by individualized suspicion. 109 The Court
emphasized characteristics of the sniff that also apply to gun detectors. As
opposed to a "typical search," a dog sniff is "less intrusive" because it
"does not require opening the luggage" and does not expose
"noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view." 110 Perhaps the most promising language from Place for the
constitutionality of gun detectors is the following: "[t]his limited
disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to
the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and
more intrusive investigative methods. " 111 The holding and the reasoning of
Place thus resonate with the notion that relatively unobtrusive gundetecting technology could replace more intrusive tactics (e.g., stop and
frisks, pretextual arrests, consent searches) as a constitutional mechanism
for detecting and deterring unlawful gun possession on city streets.
The analogy to Place is imperfect, however. Place emphasizes that a
drug dog's sniff can only detect narcotics, a form of "contraband." Later,
in Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court honed in on this aspect of the
case, explaining that sniffs were not searches because "any interest in
possessing contraband cannot be deemed 'legitimate"'; thus,
"governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband

I 06. Gun detectors will be most effective if they can be deployed without individualized suspicion
that each person scanned possesses a fireann (i.e., "suspicion-less" scans). As a consequence, absent
special doctrinal treatment, their constitutionality will hinge on whether scans constitute a "search."
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("A search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."). If a scan is not a "search" or
"seizure," the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by its use. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
107. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
108. 462 U.S. 696,707 (1983).
109. /d.
110. /d.
Ill. /d.
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'compromises no legitimate privacy interest.'" 112 Finding common ground
with Place, Caballes distinguished the competing case of Kyllo v. United
States 113 by stating that "[c]ritical to that decision [Kyllo] was the fact that
the [technology at issue] was capable of detecting lawful activity." 114
The central analytical component of Place and the cases that follow it,
then, is the likelihood that items detected by police will be contraband.
When cities like Chicago, the District of Columbia, San Francisco, and
New York effectively outlawed handgun carrying, concealed guns
detected by scanners could fairly be labeled "contraband." The analysis
changes, however, as courts and legislators compel these cities to
implement permissive licensing regimes. Even assuming passive gun
scanners, like drug-sniffing dogs, could be configured to reveal only the
presence of handguns, this output is no longer invariably contraband. With
a constitutional right to public gun possession on the horizon and steadily
easing statutory restrictions, courts will be unable to ignore the increasing
likelihood that guns detected-whether in rural Montana or downtown Los
Angeles-are lawfully carried. Consequently, gun detectors deployed on
city streets will increasingly detect not just "contraband" (unlicensed
handguns) but also "noncontraband items," such as lawfully carried guns
"that otherwise would remain hidden from public view."' 115 The
transforming gun-rights landscape thus makes it increasingly unlikely that
cities can invoke the Place line of cases to argue that suspicion-less gun

112. 543 U.S. 405,408 (2005).
113. 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (holding that the application of"sense-enhancing technology," if
"not in general public use," to obtain "information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,"'
constitutes a "search").
114. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10 ("The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly
lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or
expectations concerning the non detection of contraband in the trunk of his car."); see also United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984) ("[G]ovemmental conduct that can reveal whether a
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.
... Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct ... will actually compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment."); cf David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New
Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. I, 32-33 (1996) (recognizing the seemingly "strong
analogy between [gun-detecting] devices and the reasoning of Place and Jacobsen," but arguing that
those cases are "wrongheaded[]" and should not be followed); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (1983) ("[l]fa
device could be invented that accurately detected weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of
people, there could be no fourth amendment objection to its use.").
115. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
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detection is lawful because it is not a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment. 116
If expanding gun rights make it impossible to characterize suspicionless gun detection as a constitutional "non-search," cities will seek out
other doctrinal theories to preserve the promise of gun detectors. One
likely argument will be that even though gun detection is a "search," it is
reasonable even when not supported by a warrant and individualized
suspicion under the "special needs" doctrine. Anticipating this argument,
David Harris forcefully argues that gun scans do not qualify as "special
needs" searches because scanners serve no "special need of the
government, beyond the detection and prevention of crime." 117 Harris's
observation that "[g]un detectors serve no non-criminal purpose: ... they
have nothing to do with regulated industries," may hint at the key to a
viable "special needs" argument. 118 If a city can tie gun detection to its
enforcement of a comprehensive concealed carry regulatory regime, courts
may find suspicion-less, urban gun detection constitutional. 119 (Of course,
as discussed in Part III, the regulatory regime itself must survive Second
Amendment scrutiny). Thus, "special needs" may still hold some promise
as a constitutional grounding for urban gun-detecting technology.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the next Part, a court ruling deeming
suspicion-less gun detection constitutional (a notable result in itself) will
only be a partial success for urban policymakers seeking to preserve
traditional gun policing. The changing gun-rights landscape reduces the
ability of police to act on a gun detection "hit" (i.e., information that
someone is carrying a concealed firearm), no matter how that information
is obtained.

116. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, I SEARCH & SEIZURE§ 2.2(d) (5th ed. 2015) (asserting that a "no-search
characterization" following the reasoning in Place "will be possible as to gun detection devices in only
about half of the states" and highlighting the "irony that at precisely the time when these weapons
detection devices are being perfected, more and more states have adopted laws under which large
numbers of citizens can lawfully carry concealed weapons"); Harris, supra note 114, at 58 (noting that
the increasing prevalence of lawful gun carrying would render the conclusion that gun detectors only
detect "contraband" "questionable at best"). A scanner could potentially be configured to detect both a
firearm and a license, and to only indicate a "hit" when it detects the firearm, but no license. In that
case, technology might be able to fit within the Place-Caballes framework of only detecting
contraband (i.e., unlawfully carried weapons).
117. Harris, supra note 114, at 28.
118. /d.
119. Cf Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,84 (2001) (ruling that state hospital's drug
tests violated the Fourth Amendment because the "primary purpose" hinged on the use of "the threat
of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into [drug] treatment," and consequently fell outside
"the closely guarded category of 'special needs"').
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C. Decreasing the Relevance of Guns to "Reasonable Suspicion"

Perhaps the most immediate impact of expanding gun rights on
policing tactics is legal uncertainty regarding what police can do when
they observe, or learn of, a person carrying a firearm. Traditionally, courts
(and police) assumed that officers could stop and question someone they
observed with a concealed handgun, at least in jurisdictions with strict
regulation of concealed weapon carrying. 120 Judges' (and officers')
comfort with this scenario rested on a generally unstated empirical
assumption that there was a significant likelihood that such a person was
carrying the gun unlawfully. 121 In fact, one of the most famous arrests in
American history, the fortuitous arrest of Timothy McVeigh by an
Oklahoma State Trooper, follows this pattem. 122 The trooper arrested
MeVeigh for unlawful handgun possession after observing a bulge in
McVeigh's jacket, unaware that McVeigh was fleeing from perpetrating
one of the most horrific bombings in American history. 123 Although
McVeigh's defense team litigated many aspects of the case, it conceded
that his possession of a handgun constituted "probable cause" for his
arrest. 124 As this Part explains, increasingly permissive gun-possession
laws erode the assumption that public handgun possession is unlawful.
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment authority flowing from that
. must be reevaIuate d . 125
assumption

120. See discussion infra Part li.C; see also United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App'x 117, 119 (3d
Cir. 2008) (explaining that "Pennsylvania courts have consistently held an officer's observance of an
individual's possession of a firearm in a public place in Philadelphia is sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion to detain that individual for further investigation" and collecting supporting cases); MAPLE,
supra note 46, at 42 (discussing coercive action taken upon detection of a suspicious bulge in a
citizen's pockets); sources cited supra note 67 (listing "weapons possession" as a primary basis for
Terry stops).
121. See discussion infra Part II.C.
122. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1178 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("Hanger arrested McVeigh
upon discovering that he was carrying a concealed, loaded gun."); United States v. McVeigh, 940 F.
Supp.l541, 1546(D.Colo.1996).
123. While McVeigh was in custody for unlawful possession of a firearm, authorities
independently determined that he was responsible for the deaths of 168 people in the 1995 bombing of
a federal building in Oklahoma City. Me Veigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1546.
124. /d. at 1556. The trooper testified that while McVeigh was "very calm, polite" during a traffic
stop, the trooper noticed a "bulge under his left arm"; after McVeigh said he had a gun, the trooper
"grabbed for the bulge," "removed [his] pistol from [his] holster and stuck it to the back of
[Me Veigh's] head." Testimony of Oklahoma State Trooper Hanger, supra note 48.
125. Indeed, soon after McVeigh's arrest, Oklahoma enacted laws that would have made
McVeigh's handgun possession lawful if, as reports suggest, he had a valid out-of-state permit. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.3 (1996) (authorizing licensing of concealed weapons); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1290.26 (1996) (recognizing "any valid concealed or unconcealed carry weapons permit or
license issued by another state"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.13 (1996) (prohibiting transportation of
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Fourth Amendment doctrine centers on probabilities. 126 An officer may
well be wrong about whether someone seized or searched was engaged in
wrongdoing. But the test for a constitutional violation focuses solely on
what the officer knew ex ante, at the time she initiated the challenged
action. 127 As first set out in Terry v. Ohio, the minimum ex ante
probability level for a stop or search is "reasonable suspicion." 128
Although courts are reluctant to quantify the probability represented by
this label, we know that the "reasonable suspicion" standard is low:
"'considerably less than proof. .. by a preponderance of the evidence,'
and 'obviously less' than is necessary for probable cause." 129
"[R]easonable suspicion 'need not rule out the possibility of innocent
conduct. "' 130
Despite this low standard, courts will be hard-pressed to accept, as
constituting "reasonable suspicion" of a crime, an observation of an
increasingly common activity that is not only lawful, but specifically
protected by the Second Amendment. The post-Heller argument that a
person's possession of a firearm cannot alone constitute reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop is simply stated. In the words of a Florida court:
Despite the obvious potential danger to officers and the public by a
person in possession of a concealed gun in a crowd, this is not
illegal in Florida unless the person does not have a concealed
weapons permit, a fact that an officer cannot glean by mere
observation .... [S]topping a person solely on the ground that the
individual possesses a gun violates the Fourth Amendment. 131

loaded handgun except if transporting party is licensed); Harris, supra note 114, at 57 (noting that "[i]f
many thousands of people can legally carry concealed firearms, detecting a gun on a person does not
tell a police officer enough" to support an arrest and "[a]rguably it may not raise even a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity").
126. See Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification
Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1555 (2010) ("Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law ... has
always treated probable cause as the princip[ al] tool for balancing privacy and security."); Sherry F.
Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 69,71 (2010) (discussing probability conundrums inherent in permitting officers to
arrest based on "probable cause").
127. See Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496,502 (1st Cir. 2009) ("It is clear in this case
that, in hindsight, Schubert in fact posed no threat to public safety. However, on these facts, Officer
Stem certainly had reasonable suspicion to stop the unknown armed man in order to ascertain his
identity, his authority to possess the gun, and his intentions.").
128. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (summarizing Terry).
129. !d. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I, 7 (1989)).
130. /d. at 1690-91 (setting out contours of reasonable suspicion standard).
131. Regalado v. State, 25 So.3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (invalidating a stop after a
civilian informed a police officer that a nearby person had a handgun in his waistband; the person was
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The federal courts have largely declined to follow the Florida court's
reasoning. While the Supreme Court has not directly spoken on the
question, it suggested in the pre-Heller case of Adams v. Williams that
possession of a concealed handgun constitutes at least "reasonable
suspicion" to support a search or seizure. 132 In Adams, the Court held that
once an officer found the suspect in possession of a gun, "probable cause
existed to arrest [him] for unlawful possession of the weapon"--even
though the arrest took place in a jurisdiction that allowed gun possession
with a permit. 133 The question arose again in Florida v. JL., where the
Court ruled that an anonymous tip that an individual waiting at a bus stop
"was carrying a gun" was not sufficient to support a stop. 134 Although the
Court based its ruling entirely on the unreliability of the tip, the discussion
at oral argument revolved around the broader question of whether even a
reliable tip that someone possessed a concealed handgun could support a
stop. 135 During the discussion, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the
Court had already decided this question in Adams where, while
recognizing that in "Connecticut you could carry with a permit," the Court
"said that a frisk was nonetheless justified." 136

stopped at gunpoint and arrested for carrying a concealed handgun without a permit); see also St. John
v. McColley, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M. 2009) ("Mr. St. John's lawful possession of a
loaded firearm in a crowded place could not, by itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justifY an investigatory detention."); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 480-81 (Tenn. 2012)
(rejecting argument that knowledge of a concealed weapon justified a Terry stop because "one's status
as an 'armed party' is not per se illegal"); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa.
1997) (ridiculing the government's "radical" position that police can "stop and frisk when they receive
information from any source that a suspect has a gun" because "it is not illegal to carry a licensed gun
in Pennsylvania").
132. 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972).
133. !d. The majority explained that "the policeman found Williams in possession of a gun in
precisely the place predicted by the informant [and that] tended to corroborate the reliability of the
informant's further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding circumstances, certainly
suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the gun." !d. The dissenters pointed out that
'"Connecticut allows its citizens to carry weapons, concealed or otherwise, at will, provided only they
have a permit, and gives its police officers no special authority to stop for the purpose of determining
whether the citizen has one."' !d. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Williams
v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 149-50
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Can it be said that a man in possession of narcotics will not have a permit
for his gun?").
134. 529 u.s. 266,268 (2000).
135. The issue came up repeatedly in oral argument, with the Justices emphasizing at points that
while concealed carry was lawful in Florida, it was not lawful for a minor such as J.L. Transcript of
Oral Argument, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/19901999/1999/1999_98_1993 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); J.L., 529 U.S. at 269 (noting J.L.'s age and that
he was convicted of possessing a concealed weapon without a license while under the age of 18).
136. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135. The attorney for the United States took a
narrower view, emphasizing that "it is critical ... that there be reasonable suspicion that the person
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The view that concealed handgun possession constitutes reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop finds broad support in the lower federal courts.
For example, in Schubert v. City of Springfield, the First Circuit rejected a
lawsuit challenging an officer's Terry stop of an attorney carrying a
handgun under his suit jacket. 137 The court explained that "the officer
observed Schubert walking toward the Springfield courthouse carrying a
gun" and warned that it "need not outline in detail the obvious and
potentially horrific events that could have transpired had an officer noted a
man walking toward the courthouse with a gun and chosen not to
intervene." 138 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Terry stop based, in
large part, on indicia that "suggested [the suspect] might be carrying a
gun," and echoed the Supreme Court in Adams by stating that after a frisk
"revealed [a] gun," the "officers had probable cause to arrest" for carrying
a handgun (without a permit). 139 The Eleventh Circuit recently ruled that a
person's "admission that he was carrying a handgun in his waistband"
constituted "reasonable suspicion to believe that [he] was committing a
crime under Florida law--carrying a concealed weapon." 140 As it turns
out, the person, like the attorney in Schubert, had a valid concealed carry
perrnit. 141 The court emphasized that "reasonable suspicion analysis is not
concerned with 'hard certainties, but with probabilities, "' 142 and the
possibility of unlawful possession of the weapon "was sufficient to justify

does not have a license, and that's furnished in this case by the fact that there's reasonable suspicion
that he's under 21." /d.
137. 589 F.3d 496, 502 (I st Cir. 2009).
138. /d. at 501-02 (upholding investigatory stop where "the officer saw a man [a prominent
defense attorney] carrying a gun in a high-crime area, walking toward an important public building
[the Springfield courthouse]").
139. United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807-08 (4th Cir. 2004).
140. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304-05 (lith Cir. 2012).
141. /d. See also United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 487 (lOth Cir. 2013) (relying on
similar reasoning to uphold stop of person when officer observed firearm in his pants: "most assuredly,
the Government need not negate these exceptions to N.M. Stat. Ann § 30-7-2(A) to establish the
crime of 'carrying a concealed loaded firearm ... anywhere' in New Mexico"); United States v. Bold,
19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that "the overwhelming majority of the people in New
York State and City are not licensed to carry handguns," "the limited ability of the officers to confirm
all of the anonymous tip information, the report that the occupants of the car possessed a gun, and the
statistical likelihood that the gun was illegal" in upholding Terry stop of car); United States v. King,
990 F.2d 1552, 1561 (lOth Cir. 1993) ("Officer LeMasters' observation of an apparently loaded pistol
... would justify her separation of Defendants from the pistol in order to ensure her own safety during
the encounter."); State v. Taylor, No. 92382, 2009 WL 3647052, at *2 (Ohio Ct..App. Nov. 5, 2009)
(upholding stop where officer observed gun concealed on person based on suspicion that the person
did not have a license).
142. Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1304 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981)).
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briefly stopping him before inquiring" about whether he had "a valid
concealed-weapons permit." 143
Reacting to the perceived prevalence of gun stops, recent pro-gun laws
include provisions that limit police investigative authority. For example, a
provision added to Georgia's gun laws by the "Safe Carry Protection Act,"
and mirrored in other states, provides that "[a] person carrying a weapon
shall not be subject to detention for the sole purpose of investigating
whether such person has a weapons carry license." 144 Other state laws say
the opposite. New Jersey law states that when the lawfulness of a person's
gun possession "depends on his possession of a license or permit ... , it
shall be presumed that he does not possess such a license or permit . . .
145
until he establishes the contrary." Importantly, these provisions express
only state law preferences and cannot change the Fourth Amendment
146
calculus.

143. !d. Another line of federal cases upholds gun stops on the (spurious) ground that "the
possession of a valid permit for a concealed weapon is not related to the elements of the crime, but
rather is an affirmative defense." Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1304 (citing FLA. STAT. § 790.01(2-3)); United
States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Delaware case law regarding the burden
of proof for unlicensed possession charge at trial); United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App'x 117, 120 (3d
Cir. 2008) (rejecting challenge to stop based on officer's observation of a handgun in suspect's
waistband because "licensure is an affirmative defense" under Pennsylvania law); GeorgiaCany.Org,
Inc. v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. 1:09-CV-594-TWT, 2009 WL 5033444, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 14, 2009) ("Because a Georgia firearms license is an affirmative defense to ... the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon, it does not matter if there was no reason to suspect that Raissi did not
have a Georgia firearms license."). But see United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213,217 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that "a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm" does not "justifY an officer in
stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion required by Terry"). The licensing statutes do not
support the conclusion that a license is an "affirmative defense," but even if they did, states cannot so
easily avoid the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
The licensing statutes, in fact, mirror driver's license regulations; but no one suggests that possessing a
driver's license is an affirmative defense to the offense of driving without a license. See infra note 188
and accompanying text.
144. GA. CODE. ANN.§ 16-ll-137(b) (2015); see also ALA. CODE§ 13A-ll-7(c) (2014)(enacting
"rebuttable presumption that the mere carrying of a visible pistol, holstered or secured, in a public
place, in and of itself, is not" unlawful).
145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-2(b) (2014); see also United States v. Home, 386 F. App'x 313,
315 n.l (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) ('Taken at face value ... the presumption would dictate that
when police in New Jersey reasonably suspect that a person is carrying a jirearm, they also have
reasonable suspicion that he is committing a crime unless the circumstances affirmatively suggest he
has a permit."); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting potential
applicability of this aspect of"New Jersey's regulatory scheme" in assessing legality of Terry stop for
gun possession, but declining to assess its impact in light of alternative grounds for upholding stop).
146. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 178 (2008) (explaining that "state restrictions do
not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections" and, consequently, whatever state law says on the
question, "[ w]hen officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their
presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest").
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With respect to the Fourth Amendment, police officers' authority to
stop an armed person depends on the constitutional standard 147 -whether
there is "reasonable suspicion" to suspect that the person is committing an
offense (e.g., unlicensed fireann possession). Officers in Georgia may be
prohibited by the United States Constitution from stopping an armed
person to fmd out if the person has a license; and officers in New Jersey
may be permitted to conduct such a stop. But the question will be resolved
without reference to local statutory provisions that purport to limit or
expand officer authority. 148 The permissibility of a stop under the Fourth
Amendment depends on the ex ante probability that the suspect is breaking
the law. As explained above, that probability, when based on suspected
gun carrying, depends on the strictness of the jurisdiction's handgun
licensing laws and the prevalence of licensees. Given the changes in
substantive law described in Part II.A, these variables will increasingly
lead to the conclusion that stops justified only by an officer's observation
of a gun are unconstitutional.
D. Preventing Officers from Temporarily Disarming Gun Carriers

Expanding gun rights also restrict the actions police can take when
interacting with armed citizens. The widespread assumption in urban areas
that armed people can be, at least temporarily, disarmed during police
encounters may no longer hold sway in a post-Heller world. 149 Indeed,
expanding gun rights may mean that officers must ignore the guns they
come across and learn to interact on equal footing with their fellow armsbearing citizens.
Although often overlooked, Terry authorizes two distinct actions, a
"stop" and a "frisk," each controlled by a separate test. Police can stop
persons who appear to be engaged in crime. They can frisk if there is
reasonable suspicion to believe the person "is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others." 150 Weapons seizures are not an
explicit part of the Terry framework, but a necessary implication of the

147. Id.
148. Jd.; cf Robert Leider, May I See Your License? Terry Stops and License Verification, 31
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 387, 424-25 (2013) (arguing that "[t]he element/defense distinction has no
relevance for Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence" because "[r]egardless of whether
the legislature classifies the licensing issue as an element or a defense, the statute permits and prohibits
exactly the same conduct").
149. See supra Part ll.C.
150. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 24,27 (1968) (noting that an officer can conduct a search if he has
"reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual").
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case is that guns can be seized, at least temporarily, under both prongs:
either as part of the stop, if the gun possession is unlawful, or as part of the
frisk, if the firearm makes the person "presently dangerous." 151
In the past, the assumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon
was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession allowed courts
to uphold the disarming of an individual with little analysis. If police
suspect that someone unlawfully possesses a firearm, it follows that the
officer can remove the gun to discontinue the suspected crime. Critically,
this means that confiscation of the weapon is justified under Terry's first
analytical prong (suspicion of a crime), not necessarily the second
(suspicion of dangerousness). The weapon, once detected, is suspected
contraband, and contraband can be seized upon detection. 152
As discussed above, the assumption that the mere possession of a
firearm constitutes a crime is crumbling. This means that absent evidence
that a person's firearm possession is unlicensed, the first prong of Terry no
longer justifies the seizure of the firearm. Police authority to disarm
persons, then, will regularly depend on Terry's second ("frisk") prong.
Under this prong, a police officer interacting with an armed member of the
public will need "reasonable suspicion" that the person is "presently
dangerous to the officer or to others" to seize the firearm. 153 Courts may
agree that the inherent dangers of firearms make this showing essentially
automatic whenever officers encounter armed persons in public. 154 But
given Terry's requirement of "specific and articulable facts" to justify a
stop or frisk, that is hardly a foregone conclusion. 155 And if courts do not

151. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Terry for the
proposition that "officers had authority to seize the [defendant's] firearm to ensure their safety").
152. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993) (holding that an officer engaged in
lawful activity who encounters contraband can seize the contraband, "[r]egardless of whether the
officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch").
153. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30.
154. See United States v. Onnan, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "Officer
Ferragamo's reasonable suspicion that Orman was carrying a gun [was] all that is required for a
protective search under Terry"); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1692 (1998) (reading Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Terry to suggest "that the stop of a suspect is itself a critical event that almost automatically generates
a dangerousness concern that authorizes a weapons frisk of the suspect"); cf Maryland v. Wilson, 519
U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (crafting blanket rule that it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for "an
officer making a traffic stop" to "order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the
stop").
155. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014) ("In a state such as
Arizona that freely pennits citizens to carry weapons, both visible and concealed, the mere presence of
a gun cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that the gun carrier is presently
dangerous."); Harris, supra note 114, at 58 ("[P]olice cannot assume the existence of danger just
because a person carries a gun.").
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accept this blanket assumption of dangerousness, officers will be forced to
interact with armed citizens on equal terms (i.e., both parties are armed).
That fact itself may discourage investigations of armed individuals more
than any of the legal doctrines discussed above. The most common
reaction of officers in the new gun-friendly era to tips, observations, or
discoveries of concealed weapons may be to steer clear.
III. GUN POLICING IN AN ERA OF CONCEALED CARRY

The previous Parts explain how expanding Second Amendment rights
trigger Fourth Amendment protections that jeopardize traditional (and
futuristic) urban gun-policing tactics. But city officials will not easily
abandon crime-prevention techniques that they believe save lives. This
Part analyzes the constitutionality of responses policymakers might adopt
to try to continue proactive, gun-oriented policing in an era of concealed
carry. A starting point for these efforts will undoubtedly be the empirical
data on the relative rarity of crimes committed by licensed gun carriers.
A. The Relatively Small Danger Posed by Licensed Gun Carriers
Although there is a robust debate about the effect of gun carrying on
crime, 156 there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors rarely use
their firearms to commit violent street crimes such as robberies or
murders. 157 Thus, even if licensed gun carriers swarm city streets in the
wake of the legal changes chronicled above, strategies to suppress murders

156. See, e.g., COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND
VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2004) ("[D]espite a large body of
research, the committee found no credible evidence that the passage of right-to-carry laws decreases or
increases violent crime.").
157. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937-38 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Philip J. Cook, Jens
Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare
Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1041, 1082 (2009) ("The available data about permit holders also
imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low arrest rates
observed to date for permit holders.")); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1245 (1996) (noting that "[t]he homicide
data collected over the past thirty-five years have consistently shown that 70--80% of those charged
with murder had prior adult records, with an average adult criminal career of six or more years,
including four major adult felony arrests," with a significant portion of the remainder, about 14%,
being juveniles); Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of
Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 579-80 (1995) (discussing empirical literature that shows "it
simply is not true that previously law abiding citizens commit most murders or many murders or
virtually any murders" (or other violent crimes), but rather "approximately 75% of murderers have
adult criminal records," with the remainder made up largely of juveniles); Vernick et al., supra note
26, at 568 (noting that "permit holders tend to be a low-risk group for both offending and
victimization").
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and robberies through gun detection may remain viable so long as police
can lawfully distinguish licensed from unlicensed gun carriers and disarm
only the latter group.
Statistics published by the State of Texas reflect that people with
concealed handgun licenses (CHL) commit only a small fraction of the
street crime associated with public weapons possession. 158 For example, of
the roughly 4,000 people convicted for robbery or aggravated robbery in
Texas in 2011, only two possessed a CHL. 159 The same 2011 Texas data
shows that CHL carriers included four (of over 500) convicted murderers,
three (of 112) people convicted of manslaughter, and three (of 2,765)
people convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. 160 This data shows that
the vast majority of these crimes and others like them appear to be
committed by people who do not possess a license to carry a firearm. To
the extent these offenses are committed with guns, the perpetrators are
almost always unlicensed.
The relatively low incidence of violent crimes committed by licensed
gun carriers fits with other data about the link between guns and crime.
Many of those most likely to commit firearm violence, in particular
teenagers and felons, cannot lawfully obtain a license even if they were so
inclined. 161 Federal law criminalizes firearm possession by juveniles
(under age eighteen), fugitives, felons, domestic violence misdemeanants,
drug users, certain persons with mental illness, and those illegally present
in the country. 162 State licensing regimes provide overlapping and
sometimes broader prohibitions. 163
Empirical evidence supports the intuition that those disqualified from
possessing a firearm are among the most likely to use guns unlawfully. In

158. REGULATORY SERV. DIV., TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR
CONCEALED HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS (2012), available at http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/RSD/C
HUReports/ConvictionRatesReport20ll.pdf (reporting statistics for 2011 calendar year).
159. !d. at 1,3.
160. !d. at 1-2; Florida provides statistics on the number of firearms revoked. The summary is not
a model of clarity, but appears to record 168 license revocations, out of over I million active licenses,
since 1987 for improper utilization of the firearm. DIY. OF LICENSING, FLA. DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND
CONSUMER SERVS., CONCEALED WEAPON OR FIREARM LICENSE SUMMARY REPORT, OCTOBER I,
1987-MARCH 31, 2015 (20 15), available at http://www.freshfromflorida.com/content/download/7499/
118851/cw_monthly.pdf.
161. CDC, supra note 25, at 573 (finding that the youth (under nineteen) committed a
disproportionate number of firearm homicides); Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the
Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I 0, 25 (1995) (noting "steady growth in the use
of guns by juveniles" to commit homicides beginning in 1985); see also COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE,
supra note 156.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2013); 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), (5) (defining juveniles as those under 18).
163. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN.§ 411.172 (2013); see generally GAO Report, supra note
20, at 14-15 (surveying state licensing requirements).
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2001, the Department of Justice studied state and federal inmates who had
committed serious crimes with firearms. 164 The authors determined that
federal law likely barred over eighty percent of these inmates from
possessing a firearm at the time they committed a gun crime. 165 About half
of the inmates had previously been incarcerated for a serious offense,
about a third were on probation or parole at the time of their gun crime,
and a small but significant percentage had potentially disqualifying mental
health issues. 166 In addition, close to sixty percent of the inmates who used
a firearm reported using illegal drugs shortly before committing their
offense-although the likelihood that this disqualifying factor would
actually have prevented issuance of a gun license is small, since periodic
drug testing is not (yet) included in licensing regimes. 167 Furthermore,
there is reason to suspect that even among eligible citizens, many of those
most likely to commit violent crimes will fail to obtain a license. People
planning unlawful activity (e.g., premeditated killers) or immersed in it
(e.g., drug dealers) may eschew licenses to minimize official scrutiny.
Thus, there is empirical and theoretical support for the proposition that
police can achieve a large proportion of the goals of traditional gunoriented policing by disarming unlicensed gun carriers even if licensed
gun carrying remains prevalent. The challenge is crafting a lawful
mechanism for police officers to distinguish licensed from unlicensed gun
carrters.

B. Policing-Friendly Licensing Regimes?
Even as it expanded gun rights in recent years, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that "the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited" and thus can be regulated. 168 As early as the country's

164. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 189369, FIREARM USE BY
OFFENDERS (2001).
165. /d. at 10.
166. /d. (six to ten percent); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (prohibiting gun possession by a
person "who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental
institution"). Another significant potentially disqualifying factor was non-citizen status (five to eight
percent). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 164, at I 0; see also COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE,
supra note 156.
167. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 164, at 10; see generally GAO Report, supra
note 20 (discussing common state licensing requirements).
168. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008) ("[N]othing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places .... "); McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting with approval statement in amicus brief that
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founding, many jurisdictions severely restricted firearm possession,
including concealed firearms. 169 In fact, many state constitutional
provisions affirm the legislature's ability to "enact laws to prevent persons
from carrying concealed weapons." 170 The Texas Constitution most clearly
reflects this longstanding connection between gun regulation and crime,
stating: "[ e]very citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the
lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent
crime." 171
In light of the permissibility of regulation, jurisdictions that seek to
preserve police authority to detect and deter unlawful gun possession can
try to construct permissive licensing regimes that nonetheless aid police in
distinguishing licensed from unlicensed gun possessors. This Part analyzes
two possible strategies cities may employ in an effort to achieve the goals
of traditional urban gun policing in a new gun-friendly constitutional and
statutory landscape.
1. High Minimum Age Requirements
If forced to license gun possession, cities seeking to prevent gun
violence could react by imposing a high minimum age for obtaining a
concealed handgun permit. Federal law already imposes a de facto
minimum by prohibiting possession of a handgun by anyone under the age
of eighteen. 172 A minimum age provides officers with "reasonable
suspicion" to stop gun carriers who appear to be younger than the

'"[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the
Second Amendment'").
169. Michael A. Bellesiles, Firearms Regulation: A Historical Overview, 28 CRIME & JUST. 137,
155 (200 I) ("Every state had gun control legislation on its books at the time the Second Amendment
was approved. Every state continued to pass such legislation after the Second Amendment became the
law of the land, and they were joined in such regulatory efforts by the federal government, starting [in]
1792."); Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths
from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1726 (20 12) ("A broad range of restrictions on
the use of arms in public, including bans on the right to carry in public, emerged in the decades after
the adoption of the Second Amendment.").
170. KY. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § I; see also David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five
Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REv. 99, 114 & n.43 (1999) (providing now-outdated list of constitutional provisions of the
"[f]orty-four states [that) guarantee a right to arms in their state constitution," which reflects explicit
authority to regulate concealed weapons possession in Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, and North Carolina).
171. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478 (1872) (interpreting
earlier version of similar constitutional language).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A), (5) (2013).
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specified age. The higher the nnmmum age, the more (underage) gun
carriers the police can stop on this basis.
Currently, the most common (and highest) statewide minimum age for
concealed carry licenses is twenty-one, 173 although many states with the
twenty-one-year minimum reduce the minimum age to eighteen for people
who are serving or have served in the military. 174 States also commonly
recognize permits from other jurisdictions, where the legal age for
concealed carry may be only eighteen. 175 As a result, police in many cities
cannot assume that even armed eighteen-year-olds are carrying handguns
unlawfully.
A state law or municipal ordinance raising the minimum age to twentyone, without exception, would expand the universe of persons police can
lawfully stop on suspicion of unlawful gun possession. In fact, cities could
justify a significantly higher minimum concealed carry age. Social
scientists define the upper bound of adolescence, a time of increased risktaking, as age twenty-five. 176 Consistent with this demarcation, the
Department of Justice recently reported that "[f]rom 2002 to 2011, young
adults ages 18 to 24 had the highest homicide [offender] rate of any age
group .... " 177 This demographic pattern holds across other crimes, such

173. Brief of Amici Curiae Brady Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence et a!. at 20-21 & n.ll, NRA v.
McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-10091), 2012 WL 9085244 (explaining that thirtyeight states either prohibit concealed weapons possession or require applicants to be at least twentyone to receive a concealed carry license, and listing pertinent statutes); David B. Kopel, Pretend
"Gun-Free" School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515, 521 (2009) ("[I]n the large
majority of 'Shall Issue' states the minimum age for being able to apply for a permit is twenty-one.
There are six 'Shall Issue' states in which the minimum age is eighteen.").
174. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.172(g) (2013) (extending eligibility to a person
"who is at least 18 years of age but not yet 21 years of age" and is a member or veteran of the U.S.
military); Safe Carry Protection Act, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1-7 (Ga. 2014)
(amending GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-11-129 to provide that persons under twenty-one but at least eighteen
years of age with military service can obtain a concealed carry license); see also Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 571.101.2(2) (2014) (same).
175. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.173 (2013) (providing for reciprocity with other
states as negotiated by the Governor). Some states limit reciprocity to persons twenty-one years of age.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.014(A) (2015) ("A valid concealed handgun or concealed
weapon permit or license issued by another state shall authorize the holder of such permit or license
who is at least 21 years of age to carry a concealed handgun in the Commonwealth .... "); WIS. STAT.
ANN.§ 175.60(1)(g) (2015) (defining "[o]ut-of-state licensee" to be an "individual who is 21 years of
age or over, who is not a Wisconsin resident, and who has been issued an out-of-state license").
176. See, e.g., Diana Baumrind, A Developmental Perspective on Adolescent Risk Taking in
Contemporary America, in ADOLESCENT SOCIAL BEHAV. AND HEALTH 97-98 (Charles E. Irwin, Jr.
ed., 1987).
177. ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA COOPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243035, HOMICIDE IN THE
U.S. KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 201 I I (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pd:flhusll.pdf; see also JAMES ALAN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S. (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=966
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as robbery and aggravated assault. 178 Perhaps cognizant of these statistics,
Missouri once prohibited anyone under age twenty-four from obtaining a
concealed carry license, but lowered the minimum age to twenty-one in
2011. 179 As young people represent a significant chunk of gun
offenders, 180 an ordinance raising the minimum age for concealed carry
within city limits would allow police to endeavor to suppress violent crime
by disarming potential (youthful) offenders.
In states where preemption is not a problem, cities could enact
minimum age requirements through an ordinance or append the
requirements to existing concealed carry licensing provisions. In cities
where municipal gun regulations are preempted by state law, municipal
lawmakers would need to clear the restrictions with state lawmakers. Their
argument, in this context, would be straightforward. The higher the
minimum age in a particular jurisdiction, the broader the category of
armed people police would be able to stop and question, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, upon developing reasonable suspicion of
(underage) gun carrying.
Aside from the policy question of the appropriate minimum age for
issuing a concealed carry license, there is a constitutional question as to
the permissible bounds of such limits. The Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the constitutionality of conditioning firearm possession on a
minimum age. The federal appeals courts have thus far rejected postHeller challenges to federal and state restrictions that burden the Second

(showing that almost half of homicide offenders were under the age of twenty-four, while only sixteen
percent were over thirty-four, and explaining that "[y]oung adults (18-24 years -old) have historically
had the highest offending rates and their rates nearly doubled from 1985 to 1993 "); Alfred Blumstein
& Joel Wallman, The Crime Drop and Beyond, 2006 ANN. REV. LAW & Soc. SCI. 125, 132 & fig.6
(highlighting disproportionate use of handguns in murders committed by juveniles and persons aged
eighteen to twenty-four).
178. The FBI publishes a breakdown of arrests by age that reveals a pattern of escalating violent
crime in the late teenage years with the prevalence of robberies peaking at age eighteen, intentional
homicides at age twenty, and aggravated assaults at age twenty-one. For each crime, the incidences by
age gradually tail off, but remain high at least until age twenty-four. See FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
20 12 tbl.38, available at http:l/www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/20 12/crime-in-the-u.s.20 12/tables/38tabledatadecoverviewpdf.
179. See 32 ROBERT H. DIERKER, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW§ 41.10
(2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2015) (relying on prior statute to state that "[p]ersons under the age of 23" are
unable to obtain permits); Mo. REV. STAT. § 57l.IOI.2(2) (2014) (requiring applicants to be at least
twenty-one); Jason Hancock, Missouri Senate Passes Bill to Drop Minimum Age for Concealed Carry
Permit, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 12, 2011, at AS (reporting on passage of bill in Missouri
Senate to reduce "[t]he age requirement to obtain a conceal-and-carry firearm permit ... from 23 to
21").
180. See sources cited supra note 161.
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Amendment rights of those under twenty-one, including a prohibition on
the issuance of concealed carry licenses. 181 The courts emphasize that
restricting young people's access to handguns serves a legitimate state
interest and that age-related burdens are only temporary. 182 But the
ultimate test of such restrictions at the Supreme Court level may well be a
historical one, and portions of the historical record already cited by the
majority in Heller reference eighteen as the pertinent cutoff. 183
Consequently, while age-related restrictions on concealed weapons
carrying may make policy sense, their constitutionality remains an open
question.

2. "Gun-License Inquiries"
Local governments compelled to issue concealed carry licenses may
also react by enhancing the authority of police to investigate the
lawfulness of public gun possession. Statutes along these lines already
exist in some states, and will likely proliferate in the new era of concealed
carry. Specifically, jurisdictions seeking to facilitate police investigation
of firearm possession will (or already do) incorporate the following three
provisions into their concealed carry licensing regulations:
(1) a requirement that gun carriers carry their licenses in public;
(2) a condition of the license that license holders present their
license to police upon request; 184
(3) a database that an officer can query to confirm the validity of
licenses. 185

181. See NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
Texas law prohibiting public handgun possession by persons under twenty-one); NRA v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 209 (5th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter BATFE]
(rejecting constitutional challenge to restrictions on commercial firearm sales to persons under twentyone).
182. SeeBATFE, 700F.3dat207;McCraw, 719F.3dat347-48.
183. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (determining content of Second
Amendment provisions through historical analysis and noting, along the way, that Congress' first
Militia Act specified members of the militia as people who "shall be of the age of eighteen years").
184. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3112(A)-(C) (2015) (requiring licensees "to carry the
permit" and "present the permit for inspection to any law enforcement officer on request"); D.C. CODE
§ 7-2502.08(c) (2015) (same); TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN.§ 411.205 (2013) (same); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-308.0l(A) (2015) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 175.60(2g)(b)-(c) (2015) (same); cf NEW YORK
CITY, N.Y., RULES tit. 38, § 5-22(6) (2014) ('The licensee shall be in possession of her/his license at
all times while carrying, transporting, possessing at residence, business, or authorized small arms
range/shooting club, the handgun(s) indicated on said license.").
185. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-308.07(A) (2015) (requiring permit information to be entered into
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This three-tiered licensing suite purports to authorize police who lawfully
detect a concealed weapon (either by a citizen's tip, weapons-detection
technology, or observation) to approach the firearm carrier and request a
license. If the person produces a valid license, the officer's suspicion of a
weapons-possession offense will be dispelled. If the person does not
produce a valid license, the officer now possesses at least "reasonable
suspicion" of a violation of the firearm licensing laws. The officer could
confiscate the firearm and arrest the suspected offender.
It is not clear, however, that the licensing framework described above
can survive constitutional scrutiny. The framework's constitutionality
depends on whether police can compel gun carriers to stop what they are
doing and produce a firearm license. 186 Courts have accepted an analogous
licensing framework in the motor vehicle context, where drivers are
routinely arrested for failing to produce a valid driver's license upon an
officer's request, 187 but as noted below there is a significant distinction.
Cases from the driving context consistently consider requests for a
driver's license after a person has been lawfully stopped. 188 The same
qualification appears in the Supreme Court case most directly on point,
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada. 189 There, the Court held
that a state could criminalize a person's failure to identify himself to a
police officer in the context of an otherwise lawful Terry stop. 190 As long
as the request for information "has an immediate relation to the purpose,
rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop," and the stop was

a database "so that the permit's existence and current status will be made known to law-enforcement
personnel accessing the Network for investigative purposes"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60(12)(a)-(b)
(20 15) (providing for database that can be queried "to confirm that a license ... is valid" and when "an
individual is carrying a concealed weapon and claims to hold a valid license ... but does not have his
or her license document or certification card, to confirm that the individual holds a valid license or
certification card"); but see Safe Carry Protection Act, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
§ I-7(k) (Ga. 20 14) (prohibiting "multijurisdictional data base of information regarding persons issued
weapons carry licenses").
186. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) ("(T]he person stopped is not
obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an
arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.").
187. See, e.g., Williams v. Vasquez, 62 F. App'x 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
constitutionality of stop where officer possessed probable cause to arrest for "failure to produce a valid
driver's license and failure to produce proof of insurance"); Wos v. Sheahan, 57 F. App'x 694, 696
(7th Cir. 2002) ("When Mr. Wos failed to produce a valid license ... deputies had probable cause to
believe he had violated the law and to arrest him.").
188. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that without "at least articulable
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed ... , stopping an automobile and detaining the
driver in order to check his driver's license ... [is] unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment").
189. 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004).
190. !d. at 187-88.
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''justified at its inception," a mandatory request to identify oneself falls
within the bounds of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 191
Regulations that authorize gun-license inquiries can be distinguished
from laws requiring the production of drivers' licenses and the regulation
upheld in Hiibel. Gun-license-inquiry provisions purport to authorize
police to request a license prior to the officer's development of
"reasonable suspicion" to suspect a gun carrier of any offense. The proper
analogy would be to a police officer pulling over a driver who had not
violated any traffic law and asking the driver to produce a license; or
accosting Mr. Hiibel on the street and requesting his name based on a
hunch that he might be a fugitive. As these analogies show, existing case
law does not support the constitutionality of state laws that mandate that
an armed person queried by a police officer stop and provide a gun license.
This is critical to an officer's Fourth Amendment authority to investigate
public gun possession. If the police cannot constitutionally require gun
carriers to produce a license, officers cannot consider a failure to respond
to a voluntary license inquiry as a basis for "reasonable suspicion." 192
To the extent the "gun-license inquiries" already present in state codes,
and likely to proliferate in coming years, purport to provide police with
authority to stop gun carriers, they constitute a novel and as-yet-untested
augmentation of traditional Fourth Amendment investigative bounds. As
will be discussed below, whether this authority will survive the legal
developments described in Parts I and II is an open question. Importantly,
though, gun-license inquiries are only vulnerable to constitutional
challenge when unlawful gun possession is the sole justification for the
stop. As described in Part I.B.2, police already seek out unlicensed gun
possession by stopping people on suspicion of committing non-gun
offenses, such as trespassing. If an officer comes across a gun in the
context of a lawful stop for some other violation (e.g., bicycling on the
sidewalk), a gun-license inquiry would likely survive constitutional
scrutiny, just as the name inquiry during an otherwise lawful stop survived

191. !d. at 188.
192. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) ("[A] refusal to cooperate, without more,
does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (emphasizing that no seizure occurred when INS agents' conduct
"should have given respondents no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer"); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47,53 (1979) (holding that a seizure conducted to "require [Brown] to identifY himself violated the
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was
engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct"); State v. Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72, 82 (Wis. 2000)
(emphasizing that because encounter was consensual, suspect's "refusal to answer [an officer's
questions] would not have given rise to any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing").
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constitutional scrutiny in Hiibe/. 193 This raises the specter that police
seeking out unlicensed firearm carriers may be pushed by more robust
Second Amendment protections toward pretextual stops and arrests (see
Part I.B.2), rather than less intrusive and more direct means of gun
detection, such as gun scanners.
The best argument for the constitutionality of gun-license inquiries
invokes the generic Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" command. The
Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes that the ultimate constitutional test
of a Fourth Amendment search or seizure is "reasonableness," and that
reasonableness depends on balancing "the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security." 194 Applying this standard, the
Justices could find gun-license-inquiry stops "reasonable" given the
government's interest in assessing the lawfulness of guns detected by
police in public spaces. 195 Likely factors cited in evaluating this balance
would be: the licensee's prior agreement as a condition of obtaining a gun
license to display a license upon request; the relatively brief and nonintrusive nature of the stop; the stop would occur in public; 196 and licensed
gun carriers could readily and predictably conclude the encounter by
showing a valid license. 197 The Court's precedents dictate analyzing the
intrusion from the perspective of someone lawfully carrying a firearm. 198

193. 542 U.S. at 188.
194. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50--51; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) ("[R]easonableness of a search is determined 'by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'"));
Bellin, supra note 57, at 37-39 (emphasizing malleability of Fourth Amendment rules interpreting
reasonableness command).
195. See United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (lith Cir. 2012) (ruling that the possibility
of unlawful possession of the weapon "was sufficient to justit)' briefly stopping [suspect] before
inquiring" about whether he had "a valid concealed-weapons permit"); Nichols v. Harris, 17 F. Supp.
3d 989, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting challenge to California law that criminalizes refusal to allow
a police officer to assess whether a handgun observed in public is loaded because: "[a] chamber check
is arguably not a 'search' because it does not infiinge on a reasonable expectation of privacy and even
if it is, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because such a search is reasonable"); People v.
DeLong, 90 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (Ct. App. 1970) (emphasizing that a chamber check is "limited to a
single purpose"; "does not have about it any except the slightest element of embarrassment or
annoyance, elements overbalanced by far by the purpose of preventing violence or threats of
violence"; and its "minimal instrusion does not begin to approach the indignity of the frisk").
196. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,438 (1984) (emphasizing that "the typical traffic stop is
public, at least to some degree," in deciding that traffic stops did not constitute custody for Miranda
purposes).
197. Cf United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (emphasizing that approach of
law enforcement to ask for ticket and identification in airport concourse "did not amount to an
intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest" where, inter alia, "[t]he events took place in the
public concourse" and were non-coercive).
198. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (explaining that "the 'reasonable person'
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Nevertheless, the framework described above would place a unique
burden on handgun carriers. The significance of this burden depends on
how effective gun-detection methods become and the type of policy police
adopt for reacting to detected guns. If police become very effective (for
example, by using gun-detecting technology) and respond to each "hit" by
requesting a license, gun possessors would be subjected to routine stops in
public, accompanied by mandatory requests to display their license. The
stops may be intrusive if police employ more than a simple verbal request
(e.g., physical contact, handcuffs, drawn weapons, or multiple officers).
From an officer's perspective, a polite request may be too passive as "the
answer to the question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet." 199
A city policing effort that leads to routine and invasive gun-license
inquiries could constitute such a burden on gun possession that the
policing practice itself violates the Second Amendment, even if the
underlying stops were deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
If gun-detection efforts are more haphazard, or officers exercise
discretion in choosing to stop a small proportion of detected gun
possessors, the burden on Second Amendment rights becomes less acute.
But this easing of the Second Amendment burden raises familiar worries
about police discretion and racial profiling, generating Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment questions?00 Already, critics of law enforcement
perceive that "in America's style of policing, gun or appearance of a gun
. ... possesston
. of a person of co1or equa1s cnmma
. . 1." 201
m
CONCLUSION

In the wake of Heller and parallel legislative initiatives that make the
country increasingly concealed carry friendly, urban police departments
must adapt to a new era of lawful gun possession, including lawfullycarried, concealed handguns in crowded public areas. Cities previously

test [for pmposes of assessing whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred] presupposes an
innocent person").
199. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-64 (1968) (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32,
35 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964)).
200. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 1535-49 (concluding that New York City's gun-policing efforts
violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
201. Former Officer: Policing Takes Patience, but Black Suspects Get Little, NPR (Dec. 12,2014,
5 :0 I AM), http://www. npr.org/20 14/12/12/3 70264858/former-officer-policing-takes-patience-butblack-suspects-get-little (quoting former NYPD officer and now Brooklyn Borough president, Eric
Adams); H. A. Goodman, Three Reasons Why Black Men Should Openly Carry a Gun After Trayvon,
Ferguson and John Crawford, HUFFINGTON POST {Dec. I, 2014, 3:12 AM), http://www.huffington
post.comlh-a-goodman/three-reasons-why-black-m_b_6245962.html (commenting that police shooting
"signifies that ... the mere sight of a black man with a gun instantly equated to danger").
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committed to preventing violent street crime by detecting and deterring
public gun carrying are not likely to give up these strategies entirely.
Rather, many urban police forces will try to replicate traditional gunpolicing regimes by focusing on detecting and deterring unlicensed gun
carrying. Yet the Fourth Amendment places a series of hurdles in the way
of officers attempting to lawfully distinguish between licensed and
unlicensed handgun possessors. Depending on how the case law unfolds,
these obstacles may be insurmountable. As a result, we may be witnessing
the beginning of the end of a form of proactive gun policing long viewed
by city residents and their police chiefs as essential to public safety.
Indeed, the nascent "right to remain armed" may, with shockingly little
fanfare, become one of the pivotal cultural changes in the relationship
between America's police and its citizens. The implications, legal and
otherwise, of this change are impossible to forecast with precision, but a
serious conversation about them is long overdue. There is no sign that
judges and legislators are aware of the dramatic implications of sweeping
gun rights for American policing and little indication that scholars are
focused on the powerful Fourth Amendment implications of resurgent
Second Amendment rights.

